Software supply chain attacks have become one of the most difficult risks for security leaders to anticipate. Recent incidents have shown how quickly trust can be eroded when a single software component used by thousands of organizations is compromised. However, the next wave of attacks will not be focused on volume. It will be about precision.
Adversaries are shifting from broad, opportunistic campaigns to targeted, long-term strategies that take advantage of the way modern software is built and shared. As businesses grow more dependent on interconnected tools and open-source software components, it’s never been more important to understand this shift – and prepare for it.
The State of the Software Supply Chain
Software supply chain attacks are now a regular occurrence, having surged to become the second most prevalent threat vector in 2024. Whether the entry point is a third-party vendor, an open-source library, or a widely used cloud service, organizations often have little visibility into the inner workings of the software they rely on.
A single application may be assembled from hundreds of building blocks. Many of these are created and maintained as open-source projects, by people outside the organization – often volunteers with limited time or support. Added to that are all the commercial SaaS solutions and COTS applications that businesses rely on for their critical processes. This creates a fragmented ecosystem of unseen dependencies, where a vulnerability in a single line of code in one application can have far-reaching impact. In fact, third-party vendor and supply chain compromise cost $4.91 million on average in 2024.
Defenders are already under pressure. Many organizations report widened attack surfaces, and faster adversary activity, while 73% of security leaders said that the time from detecting an attack to resolution has increased. Security teams must also manage faster development practices that grow more complex each year, while facing resource constraints. These conditions are ideal for adversaries seeking to exploit structural weaknesses rather than break in through traditional means.
The Shift Toward Precision Attacks
Against this backdrop, adversaries are adopting a quieter, more deliberate approach to supply chain compromise. Instead of scanning the web for vulnerabilities to exploit at scale, they can embed themselves inside development ecosystems and open-source communities. Over months, sometimes years, they position themselves as trusted contributors. When the moment is right, a small but carefully crafted change is introduced. To the casual reviewer, it looks harmless. To those who install or update the affected software, it becomes a hidden foothold for an attack.
This approach gives adversaries a multiplier effect. Compromising one well-used software component can give them access to many organizations at once. They no longer need to break into each company individually. The open-source software distribution process becomes the delivery vehicle, spreading malicious code in ways that appear routine.
This strategy is also difficult to spot. By working within normal development patterns – using genuine accounts and mimicking legitimate behavior – adversaries blend in. They can take advantage of moments when scrutiny naturally dips, such as busy release cycles, team transitions, or major updates. Once their change is accepted, it travels through update mechanisms organizations trust and rarely question. The result is a quieter but more effective style of attack. As a result, supply chain attacks took the longest to detect and contain at 267 days on average, in 2024.
Building Resilience for the Era of Precision Attacks
In an environment where trust can be exploited so effectively, organizations need to rethink what “secure software” really means. Protecting the supply chain is not about implementing a long checklist of technical controls. It’s about building habits, expectations, and processes that make it more difficult for adversaries to slip into the software lifecycle unnoticed.
Organizations need to treat the origin of their software as seriously as they approach the security of their own networks. They must have confidence not only in where code comes from, but also in how it is developed, reviewed, and updated. This level of visibility is important for understanding how often those components change and whether anything about that activity seems unusual.
Identity is another significant factor. Many successful supply chain compromises rely on a single stolen or misused developer account. Ensuring strong role-based access controls that define who can make changes to code, how they’re approved, and how contributor identities are protected can significantly reduce the risk of manipulation.
However, no matter how strong the defenses, compromises can still occur. Clear response plans – such as how to quickly remove a compromised component or assess potential exposure – can dramatically limit the impact of an attack. These plans ensure organizations can act quickly when it matters most.
The Path Forward for Software Supply Chain Security
Supply chain attacks are evolving into a more strategic and targeted form of intrusion. Instead of breaking down the front door, adversaries are learning to walk through trusted side entrances that organizations rarely examine.
Those who invest in understanding where their software comes from and who has the power to influence it will be far better positioned to withstand this new class of threat. As the digital ecosystem becomes more interconnected, resilience will depend on continuously verifying the trust we place in the code that powers our businesses.
